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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FLAG MISUSE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT-

Spence v. Washington,94 S. Ct. 2727 (1974).
Defendant Spence displayed an inverted American flag from his
apartment window during the days following the Cambodian incursion and Kent State tragedy in 1970.1 Affixed to the flag was a peace
symbol, formed with black tape. The Washington Supreme Court sus-

tained a conviction for violation of Washington State's "improper
use' 2 statute.3 On appeal to the Supreme Court, reversed. Held:
The statute, as applied to defendant's conduct, impermissibly infringed expression protected by the first amendment. Spence v. Washington, 94 S.Ct. 2727 (1974).4
Because Spence decided only that the statute involved could not
constitutionally be applied to the specific conduct in question, no explicit definition of the scope of governmental power 5 to punish unorthodox flag use emerged from the decision. Nevertheless, as this note
1. American military invasion of certain areas of Cambodia bordering South
Vietnam in late April of 1970, coupled with the killing of four Kent State University
students by National Guardsmen during a demonstration shortly thereafter, prompted
unprecedented protest demonstrations and political activity on many of the nation's college campuses. See N.Y. Times, May 7, 1970, at 1, cols. 4-8.
2.

WASH. REV.CODE § 9.86.020 (1963):

No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or display: (1) Place or cause to be
placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement of any
nature upon any flag, standard, color, ensign or shield of the United States or of
this state, or authorized by any law of the United States or of this state; or (2) Expose to public view any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield upon which shall
have been printed, painted or otherwise produced, or to which shall have been attached, appended, affixed or annexed any such word, figure, mark, picture, design,
drawing or advertisement ....
All 50 states have statutes worded substantially similar to the Washington statute. See
Hearingson H.R. 271 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm.on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., 324-46 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings], which contains a
compilation of state statutes relating to misuse of the flag.
Flag protection statutes generally punish two categories of "wrongful" treatment, or
misuse, of the flag: (1) flag desecration,which is conduct, such as burning, mutilating, or
contemptuous treatment, evincing hostility toward or disrespect for the flag, see note 53
infra; and (2) improper use, which includes use of the flag in commercial advertising,
affixation of foreign articles to the flag, and the like. Thus, improper use may be viewed
as less severe misuse of the flag than desecration.
3. State v. Spence, 81 Wn. 2d 788, 506 P.2d 293 (1973). The state supreme court
reversed a Washington Court of Appeals decision which had reversed the conviction
because of statutory overbreadth. State v. Spence, 5 Wn. App. 752, 490 P.2d 1321
(1971).
4. The per curiam opinion apparently expressed the views of five members of the
Court. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist dissented. Justice
Blackmun concurred only in the result. Justice Douglas concurred with a brief separate
opinion, joining Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell in the majority.
5. The term "government" will be used in this note to refer both to state and federal
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will demonstrate, the ruling restricts that governmental power signifi-

cantly. The decision in Spence clears the way for the court to hold, in
future cases of flag misuse, that all noncommercial, unorthodox use of
the flag is protected by the first amendment.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Court's Protection of Free Expression

The full expression of all social and political views is of
time-honored importance in our society, which depends on the interchange of ideas as an essential ingredient of self-government. 6 For this
reason, freedom of expression occupies a "preferred" position7 in our
constitutional jurisprudence. The first amendment embodies the nation's decision to risk whatever unpleasantness may result from free
dissemination of all, even unpopular, views, in return for the insurance this provides against governmental domination and control of
8

thought.

The Supreme Court has interpreted the first amendment's free
speech clause in numerous, diverse factual contexts, including punish-

governmental entities. Because the first amendment applies with equal force to both the
federal and state governments, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). the scope of
governmental power to regulate flag misuse, absent exercise of federal preemption. is
the same for both. For a brief discussion of federal preemption in this area, see note 92
infra.
6. Dr. Alexander M/leiklejohn theorized that the first amendment exists to protect the
right of the citizenry to self-government, rather than the right of private individuals to
speak. It promotes the dissemination of information and views on all sides of matters of
general public import, assuring that voters have the opportunity to weigh competing
values for themselves before exercising their franchise. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).

Professor Thomas Emerson suggests that the maintenance of a system of freedom of
expression protects four important values: (1) individual self-fulfillment; (2) the attainment of truth; (3) participation by the members of the society in social, including political, decisionmaking; and (4) maintenance of the balance between stability and change in
society. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-15
(Random House ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as EMERSON].
7. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516. 529-30 (1945). A critical discussion of the first amendment's preferred status
is presented in Kovacs v. Cooper. 336 U.S. 77, 89-96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.. concurring).
8. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 273-76 (1964). But see Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 94 S. Ct. 2714 (1974) (municipal policy of not permitting political advertising but allowing other types of advertising on transit vehicles held not
violative of political candidate's first amendment rights).
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ment of political advocacy,9 freedom of belief,10 right of association,"
defamation and criminal libel, 12 "fighting words,"'1 3 obscenity, 14 picketing, 15 and leafleting, 16 to name but a few. In so doing, the Court in
the last half-century has used several, sometimes conflicting, approaches to first amendment adjudication. At one time, the government could suppress communication merely by showing that the
communication had a "bad tendency"-a tendency to "corrupt morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace.' 7 The bad tendency
test was in conflict with Justice Holmes' stricter "clear and present
danger" test' 8 for some years. The clear and present danger test,

which enjoyed its widest use in the 1940's, 19 required, in its "mature"
application, that "the substantive evil mist be extremely serious and

the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be pun9. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (upholding right to inflammatory speech where imminent lawless action not likely); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding conviction under Espionage Act for attempting to cause insubordination in the military by circulation of leaflets; "clear and present danger" present).
10. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (states may require bar applicants to indicate whether they advocate violent overthrow of government); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (salute to flag
cannot be compelled).
11. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (upholding refusal of NAACP to disclose membership lists to state).
12. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel of public
figures is protected unless done with "actual malice," i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974) (defamation
of private figure, even when concerning issues of public interest, need not include actual
malice); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding group libel law prohibiting defamation of a race).
13. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding breach
of peace conviction for use of personally abusive epithets). But cf. Plummer v. City of
Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973) (male cab driver's vulgar and abusive language toward
female passenger, though "fighting words," unpunishable because of facial overbreadth
of ordinance); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (abusive language toward
police protected due to facial overbreadth of ordinance).
14. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (formulating standards by
which sexually oriented material is to be constitutionally evaluated).
15. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (reversing breach of
peace conviction of blacks who peacefully demonstrated near state capital building);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (peaceful labor picketing protected).
16. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (state interest in preventing littering does not justify prohibition on leafleting); Lovell v.Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
(voiding permit system for handbills).
17. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925).
18. The test was first formulated in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919),
but did not win the approval of a majority of the Court until Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242 (1937), wherein the Court held that the "dangerous tendency" of words was
insufficient to justify abridgment of speech.
19. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
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ished." 20 After a period of nonuse, the clear and present danger test
was revived recently in Brandenburg v. Ohio,21 in which the Court

held that proscription of inflammatory advocacy is constitutional only
where the advocacy is "directed to inciting or producing imminent
22
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
Beginning with Schneider v. State,23 the Court has on many occasions used an "ad hoc" balancing approach, weighing anew in each
and
case the competing interests in free speech and public order
24
States:
United
v.
Dennis
in
justified
was
approach
This
safety.
The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in national security are better served by a candid and informed
weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial
process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the
non-Euclidean problems to be solved.
The demise of the balancing test was suspected after United States v.
Robel,2 5 in which the Court declined to adopt a balancing approach,
resting its decision instead upon the presence of less restrictive means

for Congress to realize its desired objective.2 6 But reversion to a balancing approach soon followed.2 7 Thus, no one test has been exclu-

20. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
21. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
22. Id. at 447.
23. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
24. 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.. concurring) (case sustained
constitutionality of, and upheld convictions under, the Smith Act, which prescribed
advocacy of the overthrow by force and violence of the government of the United
States).
25. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
26. The Court stated:
We recognize that both interests are substantial, but we deem it inappropriate
for this Court to label one as being more important or more substantial than
the other .... [W] e have confined our analysis to whether Congress has adopted
a constitutional means in achieving its concededly legitimate legislative goal.
In making this determination we have found it necessary to measure the
validity of the means adopted by Congress against both the goal it has sought
to achieve and the specific prohibitions of the First Amendment. But we have in
no way "balanced" those respective interests. We have ruled only that the
Constitution requires that the conflict between congressional power and individual
rights be accommodated by legislation drawn more narrowly to avoid the conflict.
Id. at 268 n.20. For earlier less-restrictive-means cases, see Shelton v. Tucker. 364
U.S. 479. 488 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
27. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968): Lloyd
Corp, Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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sively utilized by the Court. 28

B.

Symbolic Speech Adjudication

One reason for challenges to the constitutionality of statutes punishing flag misuse has been the Court's failure to establish a satisfactory doctrinal framework2 9 within which to address the question of
whether the first amendment protects nonverbal communication,3 0 or
"symbolic speech." 3 '
In 1968, concerned that "an apparently limitless variety of conduct
[might] be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea, '3 2 the Court in United States
v. O'Brien3 3 affirmed a conviction for burning of a draft card in violation of federal law. 34 The Court reasoned that the constitutional grant
of power to Congress to raise and support armies provided Congress
28. Both the clear and present danger test and ad hoc balancing test have been
subjected to strong criticism. Professor Meiklejohn suggested that the first amendment
itself has already struck any balance to be made in favor of free expression. Moreover,
he believed that any judicially created test such as the clear and present danger test
allows government to suppress free speech at those times when a self-governing
people needs it the most-times of crisis when a fully informed citizenry is most
necessary to assure that correct and wise decisions are made. A. MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). Justices Black and
Douglas have been the most active judicial proponents of this "absolutist" approach,
see, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 720 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring), which thus far has failed to gain widespread following on the
Court.
29. A principled method of first amendment adjudication is necessary in order to
assure that the personal predilections of individual justices and courts' tendencies to
accord greater weight to legislative judgments than to interests protected by the first
amendment are eschewed in the decision-making process. See EMERSON, note 6
supra, at 54-56. See also Frantz, Is the FirstAmendment Law--A Reply to Professor
Mendelson, 51 CALIF. REV. 729, 746-49 (1963), pointing out that any result is possible

when balancing tests are used because judicial characterization of the respective interests to be balanced largely determines the weight to be assigned each.
30. A subquestion to be addressed is whether the first amendment protects
unorthodox use of the American flag.
31. As used in this note, "symbolic speech," "symbolic expression" and "symbolic
conduct" have the same meaning-expressive or communicative conduct which,
although perhaps violative of a statute directed at other than verbal speech, may be
protected by the first amendment. The Supreme Court uses the terms "expression"
and "communication" in place of "speech" frequently. See, e.g., Police Dept. v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("expression"); Pell v. Procunier, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2806
(1974) ("communication").
32. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
33. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
34. 50 U.S.C. § 462(b)(3) (1970).
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the authority to regulate conduct which interfered with the government's legitimate interest in a smoothly functioning draft system. Prohibition of draft-card burning, it continued, assures that registrants
have their cards in their possession at all times, and thus promotes the
government's interest. In reaching its decision the Court developed the
35
following four-part test:
[W] e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
[2] if it furthers an important and substantial governmental interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
The O'Brien framework and its application are unsatisfactory for
several reasons. First, the Court denominated as "substantial" the
governmental interest in assuring that all registrants retain their draft
cards in their possession. In reality, this is no more than an interest in
administrative convenience. 3 6 Second, the statute was underinclusive,
prohibiting only one subclass of conduct (destroying draft cards by
burning)--conduct intended to be communicative-within the total
range of evil sought to be cured (nonpossession of draft cards). This
suggests that the statutory prohibition, if not the underlying "governmental interest," was not "unrelated to the suppression of free expression," but in fact directly related to that end. Finally, the Court allowed mere "furtherance" of a governmental interest to override the
right of free expression. More appropriate in the first amendment area
is the requirement that expressive conduct, to be prohibited, must interfere with a governmental interest in a substantial manner.3 7 Only
then is symbolic expression accorded the same level of constitutional
protection as is provided to "pure speech." 38
35.

391 U.S. at 377.

36.

See Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning

Case, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 22 (1968). Professor Alfange also points out that, as
used by the Court, "substantial governmental interest" means an interest "having
substance," rather than, as its normal usage would suggest, a strong, or compelling.
interest. Id. at 23-24.
37. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 29, 42 44 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nimmer].
38. The Court has distinguished "pure", or verbal, speech from "speech plus"-that communication, such as picketing, leafleting or demonstrating, which includes
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A year after O'Brien, the Court in Tinker v. Des Moines School
District39 adopted the more appropriate standard and held that high
school students could not constitutionally be prevented from wearing
black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam war. The Court
noted that "[T] he wearing of armbands ...was closely akin to 'pure
speech' which ... is entitled to comprehensive protection ...."40 In
contrast to O'Brien's "furtherance" standard, the Tinker Court stated
that symbolic conduct interfering with a legitimate state interest must
do so "materially and substantially" 4 ' before its restriction may be justified. The posited state interest in Tinker, preservation of order at the
school, would have been "furthered" by prohibiting the armbands,
since disruption would have been nonexistent in their absence. Furtherance of the state interest in this manner would have satisfied the
test formulated in O'Brien: The restriction of first amendment freedoms was "essential" to further the state's interest-even stationing police throughout the school would not have ensured perfect tranquility.
The result in the two cases was different only because the symbolic
conduct in Tinker was accorded first amendment protection commen42
surate with that given pure speech.

non-"pure" aspects. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); NAACP

v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 455 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Professor
Kalven's cogent criticism of the pure speech-speech plus dichotomy. Kalven, The
Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 Sup. CT.REv. 1, 23-25 (1965).

When pure speech is involved, "furtherance" of a legitimate state interest (one
"within the constitutional power of government") is not a sufficient justification for
restricting communication. For example, prohibiting inflammatory speech generally

would certainly "further" the state's interest in preventing disorder, a state interest

"unrelated to the suppression of free expression." But even where speech actually

prompts disorder, restriction of that speech, which is all that is "essential to the
furtherance of that interest," is prevented by the first amendment in the absence of a
"clear and present danger of a serious and substantive evil that rises far above public

inconvenience, annoyance or unrest." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
39. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
40. Id. at 505-06.
41.
42.

ld.at 509.
The slight disruption engendered by the symbolic conduct in Tinker could not

justify its prohibition. Compare Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), where the
immediacy of physical dander' to -an intentionally inflammatory and provocative
speaker from a hostile audience, and the absence of adequate police personnel to

protect him, were held to justify his arrest for disturbing the peace. See also the
characterization of Feiner in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). But see
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337

U.S. I (1949).
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Flags,Symbolic Speech and the First Amendment

Flags have for some time played a role in developing doctrinal
frameworks within which to address both first amendment and due
process issues.43 In 1907, the Court in Halter v. Nebraska44 decided
that use of the American flag in commercial advertising could constitutionally be proscribed. Over 40 years ago, in Stromberg v. California,45 the Court held invalid a statute prohibiting display of a red
communist flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government.
Refusal to salute the American flag was held protected in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette.4 6
The Court confronted four cases involving misuse of the American
flag in the 5-year interval between Tinker and Spence, but failed to
reach the symbolic speech question in each instance. The same Term
it decided Tinker, the Court declined to confront the question of con43.

The United States flag was adopted by resolution of the Continental Congress

on June

14,

1777.

2 JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN

CONGRESS

165 (1823).

The

present form of the flag is prescribed by statute, 4 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), which
is implemented by Executive Order No. 10834, 24 C.F.R. 6865 (1959). Widespread use
of the flag in commercial advertising in the latter part of the 19th century prompted
the appearance of flag protection statutes, beginning with South Dakota's in 1897. Ch.
22-9-1, 2 (1967). See Mittlebeeler, Flag Profanation and the Law, 60 Ky. L.J.
885, 888 & 893 (1970). In 1917 the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws presented to the states a Uniform Flag Act, which has since been adopted in
16 states. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATES LAWS 373 (1971). Most other flag protection statutes are patterned after the
Uniform Act. See Hearings, note 2 supra, at 324-46.
The first federal flag protection legislation appeared in 1917. when Congress enacted
an "improper use" statute applicable to the District of Columbia. 4 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
The federal flag desecration law, which applies throughout the nation, was not enacted until 1968. 18 U.S.C. § 700(1970).
44. 205 U.S. 34 (1907). See note 89 infra. In Halter the Court ruled that neither
fourteenth amendment due process nor privileges and immunities were infringed by
the statute in question, which closely resembled the statute in Spence. The first amendment was not considered.
45. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Stromberg was the first occasion for the Court to
invalidate a statute "on its face," i.e., without reference to the conduct at issue, for
violating the first amendment. It was also the Court's first recognition that first
amendment "speech" may include symbolic conduct.
46. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The Barnette case was brought by Jehova's Witnesses,
but turned on principles broader than those of freedom of religion:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official.
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism.
religion or other matters of opinion ....
Id. at 642. Barnette involved punishment for failure to act in a prescribed
manner, whereas Spence involved punishment for acting in a proscribed manner.
Nevertheless, Barnette is important for the Court's decision that behavior toward
symbols, including the American flag itself, is not exempt from first amendment consideration.
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stitutional protection for flag misuse in Street v. New York. 4 7 There, a
conviction for flag burning was overturned because the statute involved permitted punishment for words contemptuous of the flag;
since it could not be determined from the record whether defendant's
conviction rested on his actions or on his accompanying derogatory
language, reversal was mandated by the protection due "pure speech."
The Court enumerated four conceivable state interests served by a flag
48
desecration statute and found all four constitutionally wanting: (1)
deterrence of incitement to unlawful activity; (2) prevention of
breaches of the peace caused by hostile reactions to contemptuous use
of the flag; (3) protection of the sensibilities of passersby; and (4) assurance that citizens maintain proper respect for the flag.
In the second case, Cowgill v. California,4 9 the Court dismissed defendant's appeal from a conviction for wearing a vest made from a
flag. Although he concurred in the dismissal Justice Harlan noted the
need to consider a case where the issue of "expressive" flag use was
"adequately flushed." 5 0
In People v. RadichA1 the third case in the interval, an equally
divided Court, with Justice Douglas not participating, affirmed a New
York conviction for use of the American flag in an anti-war art
exhibit.
Finally, three months before the Spence decision, the Court in
Smith v. Goguen52 confronted a Massachusetts statute subjecting to

47.

394U.S. 576(1969).

48. Id. at 590-91. The last three interests were examined and likewise rejected in
Spence. 94 S. Ct. at 2731.
49. 274 Cal. App. 2d 923, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1969),
appealdismissed, 396 U.S. 371 (1970).
50. Id. at 372.
51. 26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, affd by an equally

divided court, 401 U.S. 531 (1971). The exhibit included a representation of the
flag draped over a phallic symbol. Although no opinions accompanied the affirmance,
the identity and reasoning of the Justices on each side of the question may be
guessed with some probability of accuracy. Justices Black and White, dissenters in
Street, likely voted to affirm. They were no doubt joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackman, both of whom dissented in Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974)

(discussed at notes 52-67 and accompanying text infra). Thus, those willing to
reverse were probably Justices Harlan, Brennan, Stewart and Marshall. Had Justice
Douglas participated, Spence would probably have been unnecessary. The Court's

action in Radich might be explainable as a reluctance to use that case's factual setting
as the vehicle for the result reached in Spence-a holding which, on any facts, is
quite distasteful to many American vexillophiles. Compare Van Slyke v. Texas,

94 S. Ct. 3198 (1974), discussed at note 124 infra.
52. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
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criminal liability anyone who "treats contemptuously" the flag of
the United States. 53 In Goguen defendant had worn a replica of the
American flag sewn to the seat of his pants. Attacking his conviction
54
by habeas corpus, he prevailed in the United States district court
on grounds that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 55 The court of appeals affirmed. 56 The Supreme Court, without addressing the overbreadth issue, affirmed on the vagueness ground,
holding that the statutory language, as applied to Goguen, violated
57
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

53.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 5 (1971). All but nine states have statutes

prohibiting "contemptuous" treatment of the flag. Hearings, note 2 supra, at
324-46. Eight of these-Alaska, California, Connecticut. Minnesota, Nevada, New
Jersey. Oklahoma and Wyoming-prohibit "defiling" the flag. id., while the ninth.
Texas, prohibits "knowing[ ] desecrat [ion]," TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.09 (West 1974):
both latter types of statutes seem similar in effect. (Compare the definition of "defile"
with that of "desecrate." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 592. 610 (1961).)

54. Goguen v. Smith. 343 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1972). The conviction had
been affirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Goguen.Mass.-, 279 N.E.2d 666 11972).
55. For what are widely regarded as the best discussions of the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines, see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960): Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970). The overbreadth issue was presented in both
Goguen and Spence. Had the Court in either case found the statute involved facially
overbroad. many of the state and federal flag protection stututes would have been
invalidated. See note 53 supra. Briefly stated, the overbreadth doctrine calls for reversal of convictions obtained under statutes which sweep within their scope activity
protected by the first amendment, because of the danger of statutes which discourage
free expression. A statute may be invalidated as "facially" overbroad. without regard
to whether the immediate conduct in question might constitutionally be proscribed.
See, e.g., Plummer v. City of Columbus. 414 U.S. 2 (1973). Or. where a statute is not
facially overbroad, it may nevertheless by overbroad "'as
applied." i.e., unconstitutional
in its application to the particular conduct before the court. See, e.g.. Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965) (limiting construction on appeal does not
validate conviction under ordinance prohibiting protected activity). For a recent
instance of the Court concluding that a statute, although susceptible of reaching a notinsignificant proportion of protected conduct, was neither facially overbroad nor overbroad as applied, see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
56. Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1972). Senior Circuit Judge Hamley.
sitting by designation from the Ninth Circuit, concurred in the result but preferred
to rely on the vagueness ground alone, finding no need to reach the overbreadth
issue. Thus, his disposition of the case was similar to the Supreme Court's.
57. 415 U.S. at 578. The Court summarized the vagueness doctrine's purposes.
Id. at 572 73. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-14 (1972). more
extensively explained those purposes: (1)that persons of ordinary intelligence not be
punished where they are unable to ascertain what conduct is expected of them: (2)
that arbitrary enforcement be avoided by requiring explicit standards for those who
enforce the law: and (3) that first amendment freedoms not be inhibited by uncertainty as to whether particular conduct is proscribed. In Grayned, the Court refused
to rule that a statute prohibiting noise near schools was vague as applied, in spite of
the fact that defendant's conduct, on the record, did not appear to contravene the

178

Flag Misuse
The Goguen Court purported to reach its result without considering
whether unorthodox flag use may constitutionally be proscribed.58
The Court did note that where a statute's literal sweep reaches expression protected by the first amendment, the vagueness doctrine requires
a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.5 9 But the decision was based on the failure of the statute to meet the less stringent
requirement, applicable to all statutes, that legislation establish min60
imal guidelines to govern law enforcement.
Justice White, though not agreeing that the statute was vague, concurred in the judgment on first amendment grounds. 6 1 He emphasized
statute. Failure of counsel to raise the as-applied argument was apparently responsible. 408 U.S. at 106 n.l.
58. 415 U.S. at 583 n.32.
59. Id. at 573. State statutes may be judicially narrowed and construed by state
courts to eliminate defects of vagueness. In the absence of state court construction,
which was absent in Goguen, the Supreme Court evaluates statutes as they appear
before it. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971).
Because of the importance of first amendment expression in this society, and because
regulations relating to economic enterprise are likely to be consulted beforehand by
those affected, a "double standard" of vagueness scrutiny exists. A stricter standard
of scrutiny is applied to statutes infringing upon first amendment, as opposed to nonfirst amendment, interests. This point was illustrated in Ashton v. Kentucky, 384
U.S. 195 (1966), wherein a conviction for the common law offense of criminal libel
was reversed. The Court stated:
Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When First Amendment
rights are involved, we look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating
conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press
suffer.
Id. at 200 (footnotes omitted).
60. 415 U.S. at 574. The "treats contemptuously" language was declared to be:
void for vagueness as applied to Goguen because it subjected him to criminal
liability under a standard so indefinite that police, court and jury were free to
react to nothing more than their own preference for treatment of the flag.
Id. at 578. The Court rejected the argument that Goguen was an extreme, or "hardcore" violator, one whose conduct was clearly prohibited by the statute.
It is important to distinguish between the judicially created "as-applied" and "facial"
vagueness tests. For example, a statute which is vague with regard to the permissibility
of some acts may be clearly prohibitive of others. A defendant whose conduct fell in
the vague category could prevail on the theory that the statute as applied to him was
vague. A defendant whose conduct was clearly prohibited, i.e., a "hard-core" violator,
would prevail only if the entire statute was drawn in language so broad as to reach a
significant proportion of protected conduct. Here the lines between due process
vagueness. theory and first amendment overbreath theory blur. See Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine,83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 871-75 (1970).
61. 415 U.S. at 583-90. The three dissenting Justices agreed with Justice White
that the statute was not vague. Justice Blackmun, joined by the Chief Justice, considered the statute and conviction thereunder valid under the first amendment because
the statute had been determined by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts not
to punish speech, and because Goguen did violate the physical integrity of the flag
by affixing it to his pants. Id. at 590-91; see note 62 and accompanying text infra.
Justice Rehnquist, also joined by the Chief Justice, dismissed the vagueness contention:
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that under the statute a conviction of Goguen required a jury finding
that he had expressed contempt for the flag, i.e., that he had communicated an idea. Justice White indicated a willingness to uphold a
statute protecting the "physical integrity" of the flag, believing such a
62
measure to be within the constitutional power of the state or nation.
Nonetheless, he reasoned that since Goguen did not deface the flag in
any manner, conviction would not protect any legitimate governmental interest, but would rather impermissibly punish communication. Such a proscription of protected speech, suggested Justice White,

[T]he Supreme Judicial Court would read the language (of the statute) . . . as
carrying the clear implication that the contemptuous treatment ... must involve
some actual physical contact with the flag itself.
Id. at 597. ToJustice Rehnquist, this "clarification" removed constitutional objections
to Goguen's conviction under the statute, although it appears that contemptuous
contact with the flag is not much easier to discern than is contemptuous treatment
thereof. (Interestingly, the Ohio Supreme Court. in State v. Kasnett. 34 Ohio St.
2d 193, 297 N.E.2d 537 (1973), used similar reasoning to reach the opposite conclusion. Kasnett also involved a conviction for contemptuous flag treatment for
wearing a flag affixed to the seat of the pants. The court, reading "cast contempt
upon" in light of the relevant statute's parallel prohibitions of mutilation, burning
and trampling on the flag, concluded that only that contemptuous treatment involving
such physical abuse of the flag was intended by the legislature to be prohibited.
Since wearing of a flag on one's clothing did not amount to such abuse, defendant's
conviction was reversed.)
Viewing protection of the physical integrity of the flag as a legitimate government
interest, the Justice asserted that the statute served precisely that interest. He concluded with an account of the political, historical, literary, musical and emotional
significance of the flag. designed to demonstrate that because of the unique place of
the flag in the life of our nation, its physical integrity should override the integrity
of the first amendment. To this writer, however, Justice Rehnquist's efforts only
further the impression that protection of the physical integrity of the flag is in
reality protection of its meaning. Such protection is an "anti-speech" governmental
interest, one that is clearly not "unrelated to the suppression of free expression" as
required by O'Brien. See text accompanying notes 109-15 infra.
62. 415 U.S. at 586. Justice White noted that the Founders must not have felt
that specifying a flag by law for the nation violated the first amendment, because the
first Congress did so. Act of Jan. 13, 1974 ch. 1. 1 Stat. 341. But he failed to
mention that laws punishing flag misuse were not enacted until more than 100
years later. See note 43 supra.
Protection of the "physical integrity of the flag" appears to have different meaning
for different members of the Court. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
apparently view most if not all unorthodox use of the flag as impairing the interest
in its physical integrity, since they were able to find that interest contravened in both
Goguen and Spence. Justice White thought that merely affixing a flag to clothing, as
in Goguen, did not impair the flag's physical integrity, while he thought that
placing tape on it in Spence did. Conversely. Justice Blackmun thought the flag's
integrity violated in Goguen, but apparently not in Spence, perhaps because there the
tape was removable. The majority in Goguen did not decide the legitimacy of the
governmental interest in the flag's physical integrity, while in Spence the same
majority assumed that even if such a governmental interest were legitimate, that
interest was not significantly impaired.
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violated the O'Brien requirement that a governmental purpose, in
order to be valid, must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expres63
sion."
One may question whether the Court's opinion in Goguen is both
disingenuous in its failure to acknowledge that Goguen's conduct was
sufficiently disrespectful of the flag to be deemed contemptuous, 64 and
evasive in its failure to state whether Goguen's conduct may be prohibited consistent with the first amendment. 65 Vagueness shortcomings were not perceived by those Justices who believed that the
conduct could be constitutionally punished. 66 Result-oriented
jurisprudence is suggested by the fact that, with the exception of
Justice Blackmun, the same Justices who viewed the statute in
67
Goguen as vague also found the flag display in Spence protected.
II.

THE COURT'S REASONING IN SPENCE

Spence occasioned further recognition by the Court of the right of
symbolic speech. The statute under which Spence was convicted was
not held invalid on its face. The Court, in a per curiam opinion expressing the views of five members of the Court, merely ruled that "as

applied to appellant's activity the Washington statute impermissibly
infringed protected expression.

' 68

Rather than attempt to set bounds

63. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
64. Cf. State v. Kasnett, 30 Ohio App. 2d 77, 283 N.E.2d 636 (1972), which also
involved a flag worn on the seat of the pants, wherein the court stated:
[W] earing the flag, or part of it, on that part of the clothing covering the
human fundament, a part of the human body universally and historically considered unclean, and the object of derision and scorn and the reference to which
in a certain tenor is often the source of fighting words, was a clear act of
defilement in that the flag was thus dishonored ....
283 N.E.2d at 639. The judgment affirming conviction was reversed on appeal to the
Ohio Supreme Court. State v. Kasnett, 34 Ohio St. 2d 193, 297 N.E.2d 537 (1973).
See note 61 supra.
65. A decision based on the asserted vagueness of a statute is itself vague unless
it spells out what are the limits of governmental power to legislate in a given area.
Moreover, to rule that "treats contemptuously" is vague as applied is to imply that
it may not be vague in other settings. Yet the Court gave no clue as to what those
settings might be. Indeed, it also asserted that such a statutory provision "has no
core," 415 U.S. at 578, which would indicate that the Court was in reality invalidating
the relevant section of the statute on its face, rather than merely as applied to
Goguen. If this is true, then all the similar state provisions lacking judicial narrowing
are likewise invalid. See note 53 supra.
66. See note 61 supra.
67. See note 61 and accompanying text supra; note 92 and accompanying text infra.
68. 94 S. Ct. at 2728.
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on governmental power to regulate unorthodox flag use, the Court
chose to examine a number of possible bases for conviction and to
reject each one, often on the basis of factors peculiar to Spence. Thus,
the Court implied that, on different facts, 69 violation of a flag protection statute might constitutionally be punishable.
Four features of Spence's flag display were considered by the
Court.1 0 Consideration of the first two, that the flag was privately
owned and that it was displayed on private property, sheds little light
on the scope of constitutional protection for flag misuse: If the flag
had been publicly owned, first amendment interests would simply not
have been at issue. 71 Even if privately owned, display of the flag in
public areas would not foreclose reasonable regulation as to "time,
place and manner" 72 of its expressive use. The third fact considered
was that no breach of the peace or risk of the same accompanied
Spence's flag display. 73 The Court's treatment of this factor likewise
fails to illuminate the scope of the constitutional validity of flag protection statutes, but suggests that breach of the peace is a relevant
factor. More helpfully, in Street v. New York, 7 4 the Court refused to
apply a flag misuse statute that was not so narrowly drawn as to
punish only those instances of desecration actually provoking, or inherently likely to provoke, violent retaliation.7 5 Conceivably, a statute

69. See text accompanying notes 79, 80, 81 & 123 infra.
70. 94 S. Ct. at 2729-30.
71. The federal and state governments may constitutionally protect the destruction
of public property through statutes designed for that purpose. Such protection is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression-prohibitions of destruction of government property seek to protect the public fisc rather than to involve the government in deterrence of speech. See, e.g., WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.61.010 (Supp. 1972).
for a state statute which could properly be applied to protect state-owned flags.
18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970) is the federal analogue.
72. 94 S. Ct. at 2729. Reasonable "traffic controls" on expression, to use Professor
Emerson's phrase, do not abridge free speech but enhance it by assuring that one
message may not overwhelm others or conflict with other public uses of its medium.
Emerson, note 6 supra, at 101. For example, if Spence had displayed his flag while
standing in the middle of the Seattle freeway during rush hour, his punishment would
not raise first amendment problems. For an instance of constitutional regulation of
manner of expression, see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). upholding an ordinance
prohibiting use of vehicles with sound amplifiers emitting "loud and raucous noises."
See also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938): Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569. 574 (1941): Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940): and
Poulous v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405-08 (1953).
73. 94S. Ct. at 2729.
74. 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
75. Cf.Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942) ("fighting wordsmay be constitutionally punished).
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so narrowly drawn or construed could be constitutionally applied. But
such a statute loses its character as a flag protection statute and is
76
effectively a breach-of-the-peace statute.
The final and most important aspect of the case was that, as the
State of Washington conceded,7 7 Spence had engaged in a form of
communication. Noting that the flag display occurred during the restive days of the Cambodian incursion and Kent State tragedy, the
Court recognized that the meaning of the display would have been
79
8
obvious to most people at that time.7 Thus, the Court concluded:
[T] he nature of appellant's activity, combined with the factual context
and environment in which it was undertaken, lead to the conclusion
that he engaged in a form of protected expression.
The Court further observed that the act was not one of "mindless nihilism," but rather "a pointed expression of anguish" over government
policies, 0 suggesting that flag misuse with less obvious communicative purpose, such as that in Goguen, might not be protected under a
properly-drawn statute.8 1
Proceeding from the fact that Spence's conduct was communicative, the Court examined four state interests which might nevertheless
justify suppression of the conduct. First, the Court rejected as "totally
without support in the record" the argument that the statute could be
82
defended because it served to discourage breaches of the peace.

76. See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (inflammatory speaker's
intentional incitement of hostile audience in absence of adequate police protection
justifies speaker's arrest for breach of peace). See text accompanying notes 127-29 infra.
77. 94 S. Ct. at 2729-30.
78. Id. at 2730. Cf. Note, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091, 1113-17 (1968), proposing
that symbolic conduct be capable of being understood as such to be protected.
79. 94S. Ct. at 2730.
80. Id.
81. Justice Harlan, concurring in Cowgill v. California, 274 Cal. App. 2d 923,
78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 371,
372 (1970), suggested that the difficulty in determining what was meant by the
conduct was the reason for dismissal of defendant's appeal from a conviction for
wearing a flag vest. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
82. 94 S. Ct. at 2731. "Fighting words," personally abusive epithets which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are inherently likely to provoke violent reaction,
may be punished as a breach of the peace. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942). Generally, however, danger of violence in other contexts must be shown
to be "imminent" to justify suppression of communication. Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Moreover, a violent reaction by an unsympathetic
audience to communication does not cause it to lose its protected status; the state's
responsibility is to protect the right of the speaker to deliver his message. Edwards v.
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Relying on Street v. New York 8 3 and Cohen v. California,84 the Court
refuted a second possible state interest, "protect [ion of] the sensibilities of passersby," 85 which arguably justified suppression of Spence's
conduct. 8 6 Third, the Court commented that Street and West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette87 dictated that Spence could not be
88
punished for failing to show "proper respect" for the flag.
Finally, the Court considered the state's interest in preserving the
physical integrity of the flag to maintain it as a symbol of the nation. 89
The Court declined to determine under what circumstances that state
interest would be a valid one. However, it opined that even if the
interest were valid, the statute as applied to Spence was unconstitutional.9 0 Because the flag was not permanently disfigured or de-

South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
See also note 13 and accompanying text supra; notes 128-29 and accompanying text
infra.
83. 394 U.S. 576 (1969). See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
84. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Cohen was convicted of disturbing the peace by "offensive
conduct" for wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft." The Supreme
Court reversed on first amendment grounds: "Those [viewing the words on the jacket]
could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities merely by averting
their eyes."Id. at 21. Given the indefiniteness of the statutory language---"offensive
conduct"--the Court could have disposed of Cohen on vagueness or overbreadth
grounds, but chose instead to reach the first amendment issue. Cf. Coates v. Cincinnati
402 U.S. 611 (1971) (ordinance prohibiting "annoying" conduct held facially vague
and overbroad).
85. 94S.Ct.at2731.
86. "Itis firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas
may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of
their hearers." Street v. New York, 1394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969), quoted in Spence v.
Washington, 94 S. Ct. 2727, 2731 (1974).
87. 3 19 U.S. 624 (1943). See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
88. 94S.Ct.at2731.
89. The Washington Supreme Court, relying on Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34.
42 (1907), had asserted this interest without defining or explaining it. State v. Spence.
81 Wn. 2d 788, 799, 506 P.2d 293, 300 (1973). The dissenting opinions in both
Goguen and Spence elaborated on this concept, viewing the interest of the state in
preserving the physical and symbolic integrity of the flag as overriding any first amendment interests involved. Halter involved a representation of the American flag on a
certain brand of beer. The case was decided without consideration of the first amendment-before application of that amendment to the states by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), and even before the "clear
and present danger" test was formulated in Schenck v. United States. 249 U.S. 47
(1919). Moreover, the Court's denial of first amendment protection to commercial
advertising in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). greatly minimizes Halter's
relevance to most present-day flag cases.
90. 94 S. Ct. at 2732-33. The Court noted, curiously, that even if the interest
were valid, in Spence's case it was "directly related to" expression; therefore, the
four-part O'Brien test was ostensibly not applicable. 94 S. Ct. at 2732 n.8. It would
seem that the same logic could have been used in O'Brien itself: the governmental
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stroyed, the interest of the state in preserving the physical integrity of
the flag was not "significantly impaired.""
Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice White,
dissented.9 2 Justice Rehnquist suggested that the majority's observation that Spence did not "permanently disfigure" the flag was mis93
placed, stating:
The true nature of the State's interest in this case is not only one of
preserving "the physical integrity of the flag," but also one of preserving the flag as "an important symbol of nationhood and unity ...
It is the character, not the cloth, of the flag which the State seeks to
protect.
Thus embracing the opinion in Halter v. Nebraska, 94 Justice
Rehnquist emphasized his view that the flag, as a symbol of nationhood, may be statutorily protected since maintaining its integrity im95
poses only "incidental," not direct, limitations on free speech.

interest in assuring that all registrants have their draft cards in their possession was
just as "directly related to" O'Brien's expression as the state interest in maintaining
the flag's integrity was related to Spence's expression; therefore, the statute under
which O'Brien was convicted was unconstitutionally applied. For a discussion of
O'Brien, see text accompanying notes 32-38 supra.
91. 94 S. Ct. at 2732-33 (emphasis added). See notes 36-38 and accompanying
text supra.
92. 94 S. Ct. at 2733-36. Justice Blackmun, a dissenter in Goguen, concurred in
the result in Spence with no explanation. His reasoning in Goguen, that protecting
the physical integrity of the flag is constitutionally permissible, would seem equally
applicable here. Adherence to stare decisis does not explain his switch; Goguen was
decided on vagueness grounds, Spence on first amendment grounds. Evidently the
Justice could not bring himself to punish expression in such "pristine and classic form."
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
Chief Justice Burger offered a brief separate dissent in which he suggested that
"each state . . . [should] decide how the flag, as a symbol of national unity, should
be protected." 94 S. Ct. at 2733 (emphasis added). It would seem that the suggestion
should be quite the opposite; as a symbol of national unity the flag should be subject
only to federal regulation, if indeed any regulation is constitutional or even desirable.
However, federal preemption of an area normally depends upon the Congress' intent
to occupy the field. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (intent
inferred from dominance of federal interest in area); California v. Zook, 336 U.S.
725 (1949) (intent must be clearly expressed). In the area of flag legislation,
Congress has clearly indicated that it does not intend to occupy the field. The federal
flag desecration statute, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1970), provides in subsection (c) that
state laws 6n the same subject shall remain in force. The federal improper-use statute,
4 U.S.C. § 3 (1970), is expressly limited in operation to the District of Columbia.
93. 94S. Ct. at 2735-36 (footnotes omitted).
94. 205 U.S. 34 (1907); see note 89 supra.
95. 94 S. Ct. at 2734.
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ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUE
IN FLAG MISUSE CASES
Flags as "Pure Communication"

As the Spence holding was limited to the factual setting of the case,
a reasonable and satisfactory framework from which to evaluate other
flag misuse cases, and other symbolic speech cases generally, remains
to be established. At the outset, it should be recognized that, given the
role of freedom of expression in this society, the method of delivering a
message is not of itself constitutionally significant. Whether an idea is
communicated by the spoken word or through the use of symbols has
no bearing on its validity in light of the purposes of the first amendment.9 6 Thus, it follows that only if a state interest in prohibiting use
of the flag or other symbols as communication is comparable to a
state interest justifying suppression of verbal communication should
the prohibition be constitutionally valid.
Ideas expressed through conduct may perhaps be constitutionally
97
suppressed more often than those expressed through verbal speech.
9
8
This is because conduct, such as parading and demonstrating, or
sit-ins,9 9 may run afoul of legitimate state interests, i.e., interests
unrelated to restriction of expression, with more frequency than will
verbal speech.
But when the American flag is the medium of expression, the situation is in reality always one of "pure communication." "[T] he
Republic for which it stands" 10 0 is the meaning of the flag as a
symbol; any intentional use of the flag is in some manner an expression of the user's feelings toward the meaning of the flag. 10 1 Because the flag is itself a symbol, t0 2 symbolic conduct, as opposed
96. See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra. For this reason the writer disagrees
with the suggestion made by the Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615
(1973) (upholding Oklahoma's version of the Hatch Act against facial overbreadth
attack), that where conduct is involved the full range of constitutional protections
for expression do not apply.
97. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
98. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
99. See Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
100. 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1970) (flag salute).
101. Even some flag use in which it is difficult to discern an articulable meaning,
e.g., "'camp" use of the flag in clothing, is at least an expression of the idea that the
flag is not entitled to be treated with quasi-religious respect-an idea which could
not be suppressed if communicated verbally.
102. The Court's language in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
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to verbal speech, communicates feelings most effectively toward it.
As "pure" communication, such conduct warrants constitutional protection.
B.

A PrincipledFrameworkfor Symbolic Speech Adjudication

It has been suggested that symbolic conduct, to receive constitutional protection, must be motivated only by a desire to communicate1 03 and be capable of being understood by others as communication. 0 4 Such reference to the actor's intent and to the audience's understanding comprises an unworkable and inconsistent
standard for symbolic speech adjudication. Determining an actor's
communicative intent or lack thereof may be very difficult. In many
instances, such as Goguen's, symbolic conduct may not express a particular, definite message, but rather a generalized, inarticulable attitude or lack of a "proper" attitude toward a majority value or value
object. 10 5 Moreover, such a standard would lead to inconsistent results. For example, in cases of flag misuse, reference only to whether
the actor intended to communicate would only inconsistently serve the
state interest in protecting the flag's integrity: An instance of clearly
communicative flag misuse would go unpunished while an instance of
less clearly communicative flag misuse could be punished, even where
the amount of damage to the flag was greater in the former instance
06
than in the latter.
The difficulties with a decision-making framework in flag-misuse
and other symbolic speech cases which considers the intent of the
actor and the perception of the audience make more attractive a
method which considers the nature of the state interest involved in
suppressing communicative conduct. The first amendment itself
U.S. 624 (1943), is especially appropriate here: "Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some
system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind." Id. at 632.
103. Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 1091, 1109 (1968).
104. Id. The Court in Spence noted that the defendant's "message was direct,"
94 S. Ct. at 2732, suggesting that a message less easily understood would be less
likely to be held protected. The writer has been unable to find a case where lack of

coherence of a spoken message has been held to justify its punishment.
105.

E.g., long hair on males in the middle 1960's was thought to bespeak an

attitude of disdain for many of society's traditional values.
106. E.g., tearing up the flag during an anti-war demonstration to express
hostility toward the nation would be protected, while simply wearing it as a cape

would not.
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frames the issue from the vantage point of the government: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .... ."Thus,
the Constitution suggests an analysis in each case of whether, in
view of the government's asserted interest, particular conduct may
be suppressed consistent with the first amendment.
The Court in Street v. New York advanced and rejected four conceivable governmental interests which might justify a conviction for
words spoken concerning the flag.1 07 That disrespect, contempt or
even hatred of the flag or nation is demonstrated through conduct
rather than by the spoken word does not conceptually affect the validity of those interests. The additional state interest advanced by the
dissenters in Goguen and Spence-protection of the physical integrity
of the flag-requires closer examination within a principled framework.
Professor Melville Nimmer has proposed the following useful construct for evaluating the validity of the state interest in symbolic
speech cases: 108 If a statute prohibits conduct having only a "meaning"
effect, the state interest may be characterized as 'anti-speech." If a
statute prohibits conduct having a "nonmeaning" effect, then the state
interest may be characterized as "nonspeech." Both words and conduct may have "meaning" and "nonmeaning" effects. For example,
words blared raucously from a sound truck have the meaning effect
of communicating whatever message they contain; they have the nonmeaning effect of "assault[ing] the citizenry." 10 9 The governmental interest in preserving the public peace and protecting the
privacy of persons off the streets is a nonspeech interest, concerned
with the nonmeaning effect of the broadcasts. Thus, "government
may turn them down."' 110 Likewise, a political assassination,
which is conduct, may have the meaning effect of communicating
tremendous dissatisfaction with the existing order, while it has the
nonmeaning effect of ending a human life. The state, in punishing the
nonmeaning effect, is advancing a nonspeech, and therefore presumptively legitimate, IIIinterest.
107. 394 U.S. 576, 590-93 (1969). See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
108. Nimmer. note 37 supra, at 38-46.
109. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). characterizing
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
110. Id.
111. See note 117 infra.
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If symbolic speech were accorded constitutional protection on a par
with that given verbal speech, then anti-speech statutes regulating
conduct would generally be unconstitutional; nonspeech statutes
112
would be constitutional.
C.

Disorderin the Court

Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Spence, sought to characterize the
state's interest in preserving the physical integrity of the flag as nonspeech, in that operation of a statute such as the one in Spence does
not depend on whether communication is present. 113 But as his dissenting opinion in Goguen had so eloquently demonstrated, protection
of the flag's physical integrity is in actuality protection of its meaning:" 4 any violation of the flag's physical integrity alters the meaning
the state wishes to preserve. Therefore, that state interest is an antispeech interest and constitutionally invalid. Because any state prosecution for flag misuse, whether improper use, desecration or otherwise, is in pursuit of this interest, all flag misuse (with the exception of
commercial advertising, which does not enjoy first amendment protection),"15 should be sanction-free. The state may not assert an antispeech interest and then claim that because communication is not
clearly intended or clearly apparent, 1 6 its interest is nonspeech.
The Spence majority avoided the dissent's mischaracterization of
the nature of the state's interest in the integrity of the flag. But, unwilling to flatly deny the validity of such an interest, the Court was left
to treat Spence's flag display as though it had both meaning (commu112.

With words, for instance, the nonspeech governmental interest in preserving

order legitimizes the punishment of use of personally abusive epithets, or "fighting
words," because of their great likelihood of provoking violent reaction by their object.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). However, offensive language

which is not directed at a particular, nearby person, may not be punished because
there is no comparable, nonspeech, governmental interest present; attempts to regulate

the content and not the immediate effect of words are in pursuit of anti-speech governmental interests. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
113. '94S. Ct.at2736.
114.

94S. Ct. at 1256-62; see note 61 supra.

115.

Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm. on Human Relations, 413 U.S.

376 (1973); Valentine v. Crestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Another possibly valid

instance of application of flag protection statutes, in situations involving breach of
the peace, is of uncertain constitutionality and, in any case, is redundant, given that
breach-of-the-peace statutes may accomplish the same result. See note 76 and
accompanying text supra, & notes 127-29 and accompanying text infra.
116. See notes 108-12 and accompanying text supra.
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nication) and nonmeaning (violation of the flag's integrity) effects.' 17
Even in making this erroneous assumption, however, the Court
reached the correct result. The improper use statute was held unconstitutional as applied to Spence because the integrity of the flag was
not significantly impaired. Thus, the Court accorded symbolic conduct first amendment protection commensurate with that given verbal
t t8
speech, an implicit application of Tinker rather than O'Brien.
Thus, movement from O'Brien's defective analytical framework,' 19
despite the Court's disclaimer of its applicability,1 2 0 is significant.
Maintaining the physical integrity of the flag by prohibiting its adornment, a "restriction on First Amendment Freedoms . . .no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest,"' 2 1 is no longer
a sufficient justification for suppression of symbolic speech. If this is
not the basis of the Court's holding, then one must conclude, in light of
the O'Brien test, that such improper-use regulations are either not in
furtherance of "an important and substantial governmental interest,"
not "unrelated to the suppression of free expression," or indeed not
"within the constitutional power of the Government" at all.'

22

A de-

cision based on any of these latter considerations would logically apply
117. Conduct other than flag misuse may also have both meaning and nonmeaning
effects, e.g., O'Brien's act of draft-card burning expressed his disagreement with the
Vietnam war, but also rendered him cardless, theoretically hampering the efficiency of
the military. When such is the case, the validity of the statute in question should be a
function of whether the state interest involved is an anti-speech or nonspeech interest
If the state interest is anti-speech then the statute should not be applied. But where the
state interest is a nonspeech one, the statute's application should be valid, subject to
two important qualifications. See Nimmer, note 37 supra, at 38-44.
First, the statute may not be underinclusive, i.e., prohibitive of only that subclass
of conduct, within the class of evil ostensibly regulated. which is communicative or
has a meaning effect. An underinclusive statute violates equal protection. See Tussman
& tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 347-51 (1949).
(In O'Brien, the statute punished only those instances of nonpossession resulting from
symbolic destruction. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra).
Second, to justify its suppression, the conduct must interfere with a "compellinggovernmental interest, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963), in a "material
and substantial" way. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
The requirement of "material and substantial" interference with a "compelling"
governmental interest assures that mere administrative convenience does not override
the first amendment, as occurred in O'Brien. See Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic
Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 22 (1968): text
accompanying note 36 supra.
118. For discussion of these cases, see section I-B supra.
119. See the four-part O'Brien test and criticism thereof at text accompanying
notes 35-38 supra.
120. See note 90 supra.
121. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367. 377 (1968).
122. Id.
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as well to all cases of noncommercial flag misuse, including such "ultimate acts" as burning or mutilation.
D.

Future Prospects

The Court in Spence, however, left unsettled the scope of governmental power to punish unorthodox flag use. By carefully qualifying its
holding, the Court scattered many clues that properly drawn or judi-

cially narrowed statutes might, in a proper case, constitutionally be
applied to punish acts of flag misuse. 123 It is not unlikely that fairly
prompt clarification in this area will be forthcoming-at least two of
the cases the Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Spence
raise as-yet unanswered questions and may return to the Court's
12 4
docket.
123. The Court implied that in instances of actual breaches of the peace, 94 S. Ct.
at 2729, "mindless nihilism," id. at 2730, desecration or permanent disfigurement,
id. at 2732, conduct not likely to be understood, id. at 2732, or other instances of
significant impairment of the flag's physical integrity, id. at 2733, its result could be
different.
In Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), the Court similarly implied that vagueness defects are curable. The Court referred to the federal flag desecration law, 18
U.S.C. § 700(a) (1970), as an example of a legislative effort of "substantial specificity."
415 U.S. at 582 n.30. Nonvague flag protection statutes are certainly attainable. The
most obvious method of assuring clarity would be to enact statutes providing that
only that flag use conforming with specific guidelines, e.g.. the official rules of flag
etiquette, 36 U.S.C. § 173 et seq. (1970), is legal, and that all other flag use is
illegal. While this would solve the vagueness problems, Spence teaches that the first
amendment would not be satisfied by such schemes.
124. The judgment in People v. Sutherland, 9 Ill. App. 3d 824, 292 N.E.2d 746
(1973), vacated sub nom. Sutherland v. Illinois, 94 S. Ct. 3198 (1974), denying
first amendment protection for an act of flag burning, was vacated and the case
remanded for consideration in light of Spence and Goguen. State v. Farrell, 209
N.W.2d 103 (Iowa 1973), vacated sub nom. Farrell v. Iowa, 94 S. Ct. 3198 (1974),
another flag burning case, was likewise vacated and remanded for consideration in
light of Spence.
Three other flag cases were disposed of by order after the decisions in Goguen
and Spence. In Cahn v. Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm., 94 S. Ct. 3197
(1974), affg 437 F.2d 344 (Ist Cir. 1970), the Court affirmed that the first amendment protected the display of a button bearing a likeness of the U.S. flag superimposed by a peace symbol. The declaratory judgment in Thorns v. Heffernan,
473 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 3199 (1974), that Connecticut's
flag misuse statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, was vacated and
remanded for reconsideration in light of Spence. Finally, the appeal in Van Slyke v.
State, 489 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1973, dismissed sub nom. Van Slyke v.
Texas, 94 S. Ct. 3198 (1974), was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
In that case defendant was convicted of violating TEx. PENAL CODE art. 152 (1953)
(repealed 1974), replaced by TEx. PENAL CODE § 42.09 (West 1974), prohibiting
any act which would "defile, defy ...

or cast contempt upon ...

any flag ...

of the

United States," for blowing his nose and simulating masturbation on the flag,
Though not mentioned by the Texas court, this incident, too, occurred in the after-
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Flag burning, for instance, presents one of those unanswered questions. It impairs the physical integrity of the flag, and significantly so.
Were this consideration alone dispositive in a flag burning case, it
could confidently be predicted that the Court would uphold flag
burning convictions. However, since the Court declined in Spence to
decide the issue of the legitimacy of a governmental interest in the
physical integrity of the flag, it may yet recognize that such an interest
can never be unrelated to speech. Since it is precisely the preservation
of the meaning of the flag which is the raison d'&tre of flag protection statutes, all noncommercial misuse of the flag' 25 should enjoy the
126
same first amendment protection as is enjoyed by verbal speech.
Flag protection statutes narrowly drawn or construed to reach only
those instances of flag misuse, besides commercial use, which result in
or are inherently likely to result in breaches of the peace, might conceivably be applied 27 to punish flag misuse consistent with first
amendment principles developed for verbal speech. 128 However, even
assuming the validity of such narrowly drawn statutes, they would
serve no useful purpose, merely duplicating the protection against dis29
order afforded by ordinary breach-of-the-peace statutes. 1
Absent such narrowing, the present species of flag protection statutes 1 30 should also be invalid due to their facial overbreadth, even in

1 32
light of Broadrick v. Oklahoma.' 31 The Court in Broadrick stated:

[W] here conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that
the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as

math of the Cambodian incursion. Given the similarity of the statutory language to
that in Goguen, reversal on vagueness grounds might have been possible here, but the
issue was not raised by the petitioner. The Supreme Court apparently saw no merit
in his claim that the first amendment protected his activity. Given the extreme facts
of the case, reluctance to consider the argument is perhaps understandable. Compare
People v. Radich, note 51 and accompanying text supra.
125. See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 113-15 supra.
127. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
128. See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 415 U.S. 583 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Feiner's vitality has been weakened, however, by
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), where the Court refused to allow
a breach of the peace conviction simply because a hostile audience was present.
129. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
130. See notes 2 & 53 supra.
131. 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (expressive conduct is not entitled to the same
degree of protection via facial overbreadth review as is verbal speech).
132. Id.
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well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep, [for
the statute to be adjudged facially overbroad and thus invalid].
Modem flag statutes are substantially overbroad, prohibiting far more
than flag misuse involving breach of the peace. The Court has so recognized: "[1] t is worth noting the nearly limitless sweep of the Wash33
ington improper use flag statute."'
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite the Court's qualified holding, 134 Spence appreciably restricts
the power of government to punish unorthodox flag use. Less than
significant impairment of the meaning of the flag as a national symbol
is protected by the first amendment. This holding may be extended
through recognition that preservation of the flag's integrity is an inherently anti-speech interest, one not "unrelated to the suppression of free
35
expression."1
Were the Court to choose not to extend its holding in Spence, it
would permit punishment of "offensive" flag misuse, such as flag
burning, while allowing relatively innocuous flag misuse, such as
Spence's, to go unpunished. This is not permitted by Street v. New
York: "[El xpression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because
the ideas are themselves offensive .... ,136 Because any intentional unorthodox flag use is in some manner an expression of the user's feelings
toward the meaning of the flag,' 3 7 the first amendment should be applied to protect equally all flag misuse, regardless of its "offensive"
coefficient.
Recognition of this fact would be healthy. Most Americans are disappointed, saddened and offended to see the flag abused. We would
prefer that it represent the social and political idealism this country
still strives, however haltingly, to achieve. But we have decided as a
nation, by the adoption of the first amendment, that the popularity of
ideas does not determine the legality of their expression. Because we
put our faith in the first amendment as the best means of insuring a

133.
134.

Spence v. Washington, 94 S. Ct. 2727, 2732 n.9 (1974).
See note 123 and accompanying text supra.

135.

United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).

136.
137.

394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
See notes 100-02 and accompanying text supra.
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vigorous and robust self-governing society, we should not rely on laws
which aim to insure that only one, unvaried idea may be symbolized
by the American flag. For however deserving of respect the flag is, if
there is anything about this country that is deserving of reverence, it is
the array of fundamental freedoms embodied in the first amendment.
The flag must not take precedence over those basic liberties which it
in part symbolizes.
Michael W. Hoge
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